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Abstract
This paper considers a best-choice game with incomplete information associated with the job search problem. Players (experts)
observe a sequence of independent identically distributed random variables (xi, yi), i = 1 . . . , n, which represent the quality of
incoming objects. The first component is announced to the players and the other one is hidden. The players choose an object
based on known information about it. The winner is the player having a higher sum of the quality components (total quality)
than the opponent. And finally, the optimal strategies of the players are derived.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we study a best-choice game associated with the job search problem. Here m employers (experts)
have to make a single choice from a number of items (objects) presented sequentially. The job search problem
possesses a long history and a series of alternative names including the secretary problem, the marriage problem
and the asset-selling problem. As the secretary problem [1], it has many statements and variations. For instance,
the number of items is finite or infinite, a decision-maker knows the actual value of each item as it is presented or
its relative rank among presented items only. In some models, items are random variables with a known proba-
bility distribution function. Several authors considered the case of a given probability distribution with unknown
parameters [4]. The game-theoretic setting of this problem was developed in [8]. Diﬀerent generalizations of best-
choice games were introduced in the papers [6, 7, 10, 12-14]. There are few models devoted to mutual best-choice
games, where both groups of game participants (experts and candidates) make their choice [3, 9, 11].
In what follows, we explore a two-player best-choice game with incomplete information. Assume that two
experts observe a sequence of independent identically distributed random variables (xi, yi), i = 1 . . . , n, which rep-
resent the quality of incoming objects. The first component is announced to the players and the other component is
hidden. In a practical interpretation, the first component reflects professional skills of a candidate and the second
one describes its computing skills. Each expert has to maximize the sum xi + yi of the quality components (the
so-called total quality) of the selected candidate. Within the game-theoretic framework, a player strives to choose
a candidate with higher total quality than the candidates selected by other players.
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First, consider the model, where player 1 has a priority to make a choice. Suppose that random variables
(xi, yi), i = 1 . . . , n, are uniformly distributed on the segment [0, 1]. At step 1, expert 1 observes the value x1
from the pair (x1, y1) describing candidate 1. This expert may accept it and finish the game. The goal of expert 2
consists in choosing a candidate (xi, yi) such that xi + yi > x1 + y1 to win the game. Otherwise, the winner is
expert 1.
Assume that expert 1 rejects candidate 1. Then expert 2 makes its choice, accepting or rejecting this candidate.
In the former case, player 1 has to choose a better candidate than the accepted one. If expert 2 also rejects
candidate 1, the game Γn proceeds to step 2 (actually, to the game Γn−1) and the described procedure repeats. An
expert selecting a candidate with higher total quality wins in this game.
2. Game Γ2
Let n = 2, i.e., there are two candidates for a position. At step 1, expert 1 observes x1. Define its selection rule
via a threshold u. In other words, if x1  u, then the expert accepts candidate 1 and leaves the game. Otherwise,
this candidate is accepted by expert 2 and expert 1 chooses candidate 2.
The optimal value of the threshold u can be established based on the following considerations. Assume that
x1 = u is the known quality of the candidate at step 1. If expert 1 accepts the candidate, its payoﬀ makes up
Ha(u) = 1 · P{u + y1  x2 + y2} − 1 · P{x2 + y2  u + y1} = 2 · P{u + y1  x2 + y2} − 1.
On the other hand, in the case of rejection its payoﬀ is Hr(u) = −Ha(u).
The optimal value u1 satisfies the equation Ha(u) = Hr(u) or
2 · P{u + y1  x2 + y2} − 1 = 0.
It can be equivalently rewritten as
1−u∫
0
(y1 + u)2
2
dy1 +
1∫
1−u
(
1 −
(2 − (y1 + u))2
2
)
dy1 =
1
2
.
It follows that the optimal value is u1 =
1
2
, yielding the payoﬀ
H1 =
1
2∫
0
[1 · P{x1 + y1 < x2 + y2} − 1 · P{x1 + y1  x2 + y2}] dx1+
+
1∫
1
2
[1 · P{x1 + y1  x2 + y2} − 1 · P{x1 + y1 < x2 + y2}] dx1 = 0.354.
3. Game Γ3
Let n = 3 and denote by x1 is the first value observed. Expert 1 moves first, accepting or rejecting it. Suppose
that its selection rule is determined by a threshold u: expert 1 accepts the candidate under x1  u and rejects
otherwise. Expert 2 uses a threshold v. According to a natural assumption, v < u, as far as expert 1 has a priority
in the game.
Imagine that x1 ≤ v. In this case, expert 1 rejects candidate 1. Next, the decision is made by expert 2. If
expert 2 also rejects the candidate, then the game Γ3 proceeds to step 2 (the game Γ2) with the known payoﬀ H1.
The optimal value v can be found from the following condition: the payoﬀs of expert 2 in the cases of candidate
acceptance and rejection do coincide.
Suppose that x1 = v2, and expert 2 accepts the candidate. Then expert 1 can select any from the two available
candidates. We emphasize that expert 1 knows the complete information m1 = v2 + y1. Therefore, its goal is to
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select a candidate i with xi + yi  m1. Expert 1 sets a new threshold s1 = s(m1): if x2  s1, then it accepts the
candidate (and rejects otherwise).
The optimal value s1 depends on m1 < 1 or not. By comparing the payoﬀs of expert 1 for the cases when it
accepts or rejects the candidate, we evaluate the optimal threshold
s1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
m1 −
m21
2
, i f m1 < 1,
1 − m1 +
m21
2
, i f m1  1.
Consequently, the payoﬀ of expert 2 owing to accepting the candidate with the quality x1 = v2 is
H(II)a (v2) =
1−v2∫
0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s1∫
0
[
1 − 2 · P{x3 + y3  m1}
] dx2 +
1∫
s1
[
1 − 2 · P{x2 + y2  m1}
] dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1+
+
1∫
1−v2
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s1∫
0
[
1 − 2 · P{x3 + y3  m1}
] dx2 +
1∫
s1
[
1 − 2 · P{x2 + y2  m1}
] dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1,
where s1 = m1 −
m21
2
in the first integral and s1 = 1 − m1 +
m21
2
in the second integral.
If expert 2 rejects the candidate, then the game proceeds to the game Γ2 with the payoﬀ −H1 for expert 2.
Thus, the optimal value v2 meets the equation
1−v2∫
0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s1∫
0
[
1 − 2 · P{x3 + y3  m1}
] dx2 +
1∫
s1
[
1 − 2 · P{x2 + y2  m1}
] dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1+
+
1∫
1−v2
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s1∫
0
[
1 − 2 · P{x3 + y3  m1}
] dx2 +
1∫
s1
[
1 − 2 · P{x2 + y2  m1}
] dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1 = −H1.
The above equation possesses the solution v2 = 0.402.
Now, find the optimal threshold u2 of expert 1 at step 1. If expert 1 accepts the candidate with the quality
x1 = u2, then its payoﬀ is defined by formula (1): H(I)a (u2) = H(II)a (u2). In the case of rejection by expert 1, expert 2
accept the candidate (so long as u2 > v2). And so, the payoﬀ of expert 1 constitutes −H(II)a (u2). Consequently, the
optimal threshold u2 satisfies the equation
1−u2∫
0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s1∫
0
[
2 · P{x3 + y3  m1} − 1
] dx2 +
1∫
s1
[
2 · P{x2 + y2  m1} − 1
] dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1+
+
1∫
1−u2
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s1∫
0
[
2 · P{x3 + y3  m1} − 1
] dx2 +
1∫
s1
[
2 · P{x2 + y2  m1} − 1
] dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1 = 0.
The solution is u2 = 0.637.
And finally, we can calculate the value of the game Γ3:
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H(I) =
v2∫
0
H1 dx1 +
u2∫
v2
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−x1∫
0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s1∫
0
[
2 · P{x3 + y3  m1} − 1
] dx2 +
1∫
s1
[
2 · P{x2 + y2  m1} − 1
] dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1+
+
1∫
1−x1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s1∫
0
[
2 · P{x3 + y3  m1} − 1
] dx2 +
1∫
s1
[
2 · P{x2 + y2  m1} − 1
] dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dx1+
+
1∫
u2
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−x1∫
0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s1∫
0
[
1 − 2 · P{x3 + y3  m1}
] dx2 +
1∫
s1
[
1 − 2 · P{x2 + y2  m1}
] dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1+
+
1∫
1−x1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s1∫
0
[
1 − 2 · P{x3 + y3  m1}
] dx2 +
1∫
s1
[
1 − 2 · P{x2 + y2  m1}
] dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dx1 = 0.237.
4. Equally weighted players
In this section, we assume that the experts have equal weights. If both experts accept a candidate, the latter
selects each of them with equal probability 1
2
.
Let n = 1, i.e., the experts consider only one candidate. Obviously, both experts accept the candidate. This
leads to the optimal thresholds u∗ = v∗ = 0 and the game value H1 = 0.
Suppose that n > 1. Due to the symmetry of the problems, the game value is Hn = 0 and the optimal thresholds
do coincide. To find them, study the following optimization problem. Imagine that expert 2 makes a choice and
its selected candidate has the total quality m. But expert 1 still continues selection and considers n candidates.
Designate by Hn(m) its optimal payoﬀ. Find the optimal strategy of expert 1 at step 1. Candidate 1 with quality
components (x1, y1) is presented. Let s indicate some value of the threshold of expert 1. If x1 < s, expert 1 rejects
the candidate and moves to the next step with the optimal payoﬀ Hn−1(m). Otherwise, under x1  s, it accepts the
candidate and wins the game only if x1 + y1  m. Consequently, the optimality equation acquires the form
Hn(m) =
s∫
0
Hn−1(m) dx1 +
1∫
s
(P{x1 + y1  m} − P{x1 + y1 < m}) dx1.
Consider the case of m < 1. The optimal threshold is s  m and the optimality equation is defined by
Hn(m) = Hn−1(m)s +
m∫
s
(2 · P{x1 + y1  m} − 1) dx1 +
1∫
m
dx1 = Hn−1(m)s +
m∫
s
(1 − 2m + 2x1) dx1 + 1 − m.
Under m ≥ 1, the optimality equation becomes
Hn(m) =
s∫
0
Hn−1(m) dx1 +
1∫
s
(2 · P{x1 + y1  m} − 1) dx1 = Hn−1(m) · s +
1∫
s
(2 · P{x1 + y1  m} − 1) dx1 =
= Hn−1(m)s +
1∫
s
(1 − 2m + 2x1) dx1.
Expert 1 seeks to maximize the payoﬀ Hn(m). The optimal threshold s can be evaluated from the following
condition. The payoﬀs of the expert gained by acceptance or rejecting a candidate with quality x1 = s do coincide:
2 · P{sn + y1  m} − 1 = Hn−1(m).
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This equation yields
sn = m −
1 − Hn−1(m)
2
.
Thus, the optimal payoﬀ of expert 1 can be expressed by
Hn(m) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Hn−1(m) · sn +
m∫
sn
(1 − 2m − 2x1) dx1 + 1 − m, m < 1,
Hn−1(m) · sn +
1∫
sn
(1 − 2m − 2x1) dx1, m  1,
where the optimal threshold is
sn = m −
1 − Hn−1(m)
2
.
Now, we can calculate the equilibrium thresholds of the experts at the beginning of the game. Assume that the
experts use the thresholds u and v, respectively, and u  v.
Then the payoﬀ of expert 1 acquire the form
Hn(u, v) =
v∫
0
0 · dx1 +
u∫
v
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−x1∫
0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣Hn−1(m) · sn +
m∫
sn
(1 − 2m + 2x2) dx2 + 1 − m
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1+
+
1∫
1−x1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣Hn−1(m) · sn +
1∫
sn
(1 − 2m + 2x2) dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dx1 +
1∫
u
0 · dx1 =
=
u∫
v
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−x1∫
0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣Hn−1(x1 + y1) · sn +
x1+y1∫
sn
(1 − 2(x1 + y1) + 2x2) dx2 + 1 − (x1 + y1)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1+
+
1∫
1−x1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣Hn−1(x1 + y1) · sn +
1∫
sn
(1 − 2(x1 + y1) + 2x2) dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dx1.
The payoﬀ function H(u, v) is concave in u and convex in v. Consequently, the game admits a unique equilib-
rium. The optimal thresholds of the experts equal each other and meet the equations
1−u∗∫
0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣Hn−1(u∗ + y1) · sn +
m∫
sn
(1 − 2(u∗ + y1) + 2x2) dx2 + 1 − (u∗ + y1)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1+
+
1∫
1−u∗
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣Hn−1(u∗ + y1) · sn +
1∫
sn
(1 − 2(u∗ + y1) + 2x2) dx2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ dy1 = 0.
The obtained equations allow optimal thresholds evaluation for any n. For instance, the optimal thresholds
make up 0.5 (the game with 2 candidates), 0.637 (the game with 3 candidates) and 0.711 (the game with 4
candidates).
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